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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we investigate the role of intangible assets, slotting costs and the failure to provide for 
legal contingencies in the problems that beset Burns Philp., an Australian blue chip company in 
1997. We also move the combination of problems to a 2005 perspective and ask if in the light of 
recent developments in the accounting for intangible assets and contingencies ( IAS 38) directors 
would be in a better position to inform shareholders adequately or not. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n September 1997 the Australian blue chip company, Burns Philp announced a $A700 writedown of 
assets. The size and the suddenness of the writedown led to an investigation by the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (1998) which while it did not suggest that the directors of the company 
should be faced with legal proceedings, drew attention to five matters of public interest: first, that directors are 
responsible to ensure that the board functions effectively; second that directors are responsible to ensure that they are 
appropriately informed about business performance; third , that directors must question and evaluate key features of 
intangible asset valuation reports ;fourth, that directors are responsible for ensuring that shareholders are appropriately 
informed; and, fifth, that auditors must question and evaluate material intangible asset valuations. 
 
In this paper we investigate the role of intangible assets, slotting costs and the failure to provide for legal 
contingencies in the problems that beset Burns Philp. We also move the combination of problems to a 2005 
perspective and ask if in the light of recent developments in the accounting for intangible assets and contingencies ( 
IAS 38) directors would be in a better position to inform shareholders adequately or not.  
 
`We focus on three particular issues; the significance of industry-specific intangible asset valuations and their 
difference from general principles; the importance of the classification of slotting costs as assets rather than expenses 
and the failure to recognise a legal contingency which added materially to the losses of the company during the same 
time period. Burns Philp was one of Australia’s oldest blue chip companies. It began business in 1876 operating as an 
island trader, owning a shipping line and copra plantations as well as owning, maintaining and servicing stores in the 
South Pacific. Later Burns Philp diversified into hardware and then into the food and yeast business. When it disposed 
of its hardware business in 1994, it used the funds for further growth in the food sector, embarking on an aggressive 
herbs and spices business acquisition program, which is detailed in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 
Acquisition Of Herbs And Spice Businesses By Burns Philp 
Year  Acquisition 
1988  Specialty Brands Inc 
1990  T J Lipton Co. 
1989  British Pepper & Spice 
1990  Euroma  (Netherlands) 
1993  Ostmann (German company) 
1994  Tone 
 
I 
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As can be seen from this table, Burns Philp began its acquisition of herbs and spices businesses in 1988.  The 
rationale for the company’s strategy in the market as explained by the chairman, Alan McGregor (at the November 
1997 AGM) was “it was a niche market, fragmented and open to rationalisation opportunities. As a consequence the 
opportunities presented were complementary to Burns Philp’s proven and successful yeast strategy. Furthermore in 
many instances, it enabled the company to be a single source supplier to many customers for their food ingredient 
products.” 
 
The architects of the strategy were Andrew Turnbull, Ian Clack and John Cowling. Andrew Turnbull was 
appointed to the Board in 1983, was CEO from 1984 to 1994 and appointed chairman in 1994. Ian Clack had been 
with Burns Philp since 1961, was general manager of the food operations from 1983 and was instrumental in the 
global expansion of the food ingredients businesses. He was appointed chairman in 1994. John Cowling, a chartered 
accountant, joined the company in 1979 and after holding positions as General Manager, Finance and General 
Manager Asia Pacific, was appointed President of  the yeast/bakery division in 1996. 
 
By 1994 the company had acquired a range of herbs and spice businesses with successful trade names and 
had begun a consolidation/rationalisation program in North America with the intent of achieving economies of scale. 
With the purchase of Tone’s North American business and the German company Ostmann in that year Burns Philp 
became the world’s second largest herbs and spices business. 
 
THE ROLE OF INTANGIBLES 
 
Throughout the acquisition program the accounting treatment used enabled the costs of purchasing trade names 
and goodwill to be treated as the acquisition of intangible assets. Bukh, Chemnitz and Thisgaard (2003, at p.5) 
described intangibles as: 
 
sources of probable future economic profits lacking physical substance which are controlled or at least influenced by 
a company as a result of previous events and transactions (self-production, purchase or any other type of acquisition) 
and may or may not be sold separately from other corporate assets 
 
For each of its acquisitions Burns Philp raised significant restructuring and rationalisation provisions  which 
were balanced by increasing the value of intangible assets which included the trade names, technological assets and 
goodwill. The difference between the at cost valuation of the tradenames and the valuations provided for by Valuation 
Research Corporation (VRC) a US-based valuer of company tradenames is shown in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Table 2 
Valuation Of Tradenames $A M (Years To June 30) 
                                              VRC                          Valuation 
Year        At cost               Valuation                     as % of Non Current Assets           
1988         42.8                        NA                                 5.4 
1989       120.6                       360                                11.8 
1990       140.6                       390                                12.5 
1991       178.9                       390                                16.3 
1992       194.5                       445                                16.9 
1993       391.7                       800                                23.0 
1994       484.0                       905                                26.6 
1995       604.2                     1121.4                             27.4 
1996       501.3                     1014.6                             26.2 
Source: Burns Philp Annual Reports, 1988-1996 
 
 
Their increasing importance to the company is represented by the last line of the table which reports the 
tradename valuations as a %age of non-current assets. 
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VRC and Barings who were engaged to review and validate VRC’s methodology , both used the “relief from 
royalty “ approach which calculates an amount of royalty as if another company owns the tradename. This amount is a 
percentage of revenue derived from the tradename products which depended on several factors such as “historic and 
projected revenues and operating results for the various reporting groups and products of the company” and in using 
these VRC “accepted the company’s information on these “as an accurate representation of the actual results to date 
and as reasonable estimates of future sales and financial performance”. 
 
The ASIC report due attention (at p.33 ) to the problems arising from the directors failure to allow for 
changes in the following assumption clearly stated by VRC in its valuation report: 
 
This value definition assumes the appraised assets continue in their current use as part of the ongoing business. It 
also assumes that earnings from operations are adequate to justify the investment in the appraised assets at the 
concluded fair market value. 
 
ASIC suggested as an example that the British Pepper & Spice results as shown in Table 3 below, did not 
justify the above assumption. 
 
 
Table 3 
British Pepper & Spice 
(Acquired 1993, Sold May 1998) 
$Am                                                   1994       1995      1996 
EBIT                                                  0.07        (0.7)       (0.6) 
Contribution to group profit 
(loss) after interest & tax                   (0.8)       (1.9)        (3.2) 
Tradename Valuation by VRC           1.3          1.9          1.5 
Source: ASIC Report p. 3 
 
 
There was no evidence that the directors had ever made reasonableness checks of these assumptions. 
Prudence on the part of the directors might have led to the valuation figures being at least reconsidered from 1993 on 
when they become a very significant part of non-current assets. 
 
THE ROLE OF SLOTTING FEES 
 
Slotting fees were the payments made to supermarkets to obtain the right to shelf space and in many cases to 
ensure that the supermarkets would not carry competitors’ products. Slotting fees were up-front contractual payments 
in contracts made for three or four years. Slotting fees were used as a competitive strategy, especially between 
McCormick’s and Burns Philp in the US market as McCormicks defended their business. The slotting payment for the 
initial year of the contract was charged against profit in that year, but the amount relating to later years was capitalised 
as prepaid slotting fees. 
 
The expectation under which Australian accounting rules allowed expenses to be capitalised and carried 
forward was that it would reasonable that sufficient revenue would be earned in later years to recover the expenditure. 
While the effect of the capitalisation was to increase assets and to reduce expenses, improving both the balance sheet 
and the profit and loss statement, the company was unable to make profits from the spice contracts. The increasing 
scale of the slotting fees paid is shown in Table 3 below. From a comparatively minor amount of $3.9 m in 1992 total 
slotting fees reached a peak of $185.8 m in1995.   
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Table 3: Burns Philp-Capitalised Slotting Fees 1992-96 
Capitalised slotting fees 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
    Current assets in $m - 23.9 30.1 54.2 35.3 
    Non-current assets in $m 3.9 57.3 74.5 131.7 84.0 
Total fees in $m 3.9 81.2 104.6 185.9 119.3 
Source: Burns Philp Annual Report 1992-97 
 
 
Once again prudence would have suggested revisiting the treatment of slotting fees in this manner, again as 
with the earlier expenses from 1993 onwards. 
 
LEGAL CONTINGENCIES 
 
While the focus of the company was unquestionably on the spice business, the company was involved in 
several other businesses, including among them Burns Philp Trustee Company Ltd. This company had become trustee 
for the Estate Mortgage trusts in 1983.These trusts had serious liquidity problems and in the second half of 1990 
borrowers and lenders commenced legal action against the company and in October 1990 Burns Philp Trustee 
Company Ltd was put into liquidation .A year later the trustees in the liquidation sought compensation for breaches of 
trust from both Burns Philp Trustee Company Ltd and from Burns Philp & Company Ltd. Burns Philp made no 
provision at all for the contingent liability represented by the lawsuit. The author of this paper was able to ask the then 
CEO, Andrew Turnbull why they had not done so. His answer was that the Company had legal advice that it would 
not be liable and accordingly had made no provision in the accounts at all. An appropriate amount could have been 
reasonably ascertained as Tyndall who made the claim had made several offers to settle with Burns Philp. 
 
In the event the Company was found liable and substantial funds were required for the settlement in 1997, 
with $90 m in cash and $26 m in convertible notes eventually provided for in 1996 and paid in July 1997. The timing 
of this caused difficulties for the parent company as it had to renegotiate the covenant for its debt to equity   
 
SUMMARY 
 
The information provided above makes it clear that the directors of Burns Philp were extremely optimistic 
about their herbs and spices business and took much too long to take a more realistic view of their prospects of 
making profits from that business. The signs seemed to be clear from 1993 onward that the company needed to be 
very certain that profits would ensue from this business. 
 
A 2005 PERSPECTIVE 
 
There is now an International Accounting Standard, IAS 38, which deals with accounting for intangibles. 
IAS 38.8 lists the three critical attributes of an intangible asset as identifiability; control, that is, power to obtain 
benefits from the asset; and future economic benefits, such as revenues or reduced future costs. Allowing that the 
tradenames and slotting fees fall within the IAS 38 definition of intangible assets, the directors’ assumptions about 
control and future economic benefits would still be key to their continued valuation in the balance sheet. 
 
The difficulties that beset the company as a consequence of an optimistic over-reliance on future economic 
benefits would not it seems have been reduced by the application of IAS 38. 
 
As with the treatment of potential legal liability, it appears that the directors’ ill-founded optimism would not 
have had any different result had it occurred more recently. While our discussion has focused on the various 
accounting issues raised by the Burns Philp case there is a second interpretation of the above mentioned circumstances 
which is that the directors did not seem to have adequate information about the business  of herbs and spices either 
when they commenced it, or as its development  attained crucial significance for the company.  
 
Recourse to the Corporations Act 2001 s 180(2) which requires directors to acquire a basic understanding of 
the business of the company and to be familiar with the fundamentals of the company’s business does not give any 
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greater comfort although the duty of care requirement  that  directors should maintain familiarity with the financial 
status of the company by a regular review of financial accounts would hopefully have led the directors to revisit the 
position of the valuation of tradenames and slotting fees in 1993 and in subsequent years. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have investigated the role of intangible assets, slotting costs and the failure to provide for 
legal contingencies in the problems that beset Burns Philp. We also moved  the combination of problems to a 2004 
perspective and asked  if in the light of recent developments in the accounting for intangible assets and contingencies 
(IAS 38) directors would be in a better position to inform shareholders adequately or not. 
 
We focused on three particular issues; the significance of industry-specific intangible asset valuations and 
their difference from general principles; the importance of the classification of slotting costs as assets rather than 
expenses and the failure to recognise a legal contingency which added materially to the losses of the company during 
the same time period.  
 
We conclude that while the industry-specific nature of some intangible assets still makes their correct 
valuation problematical; that the recognition of slotting costs as costs and not assets should alert a questioning board 
to the problems of the business; and that the failure to recognise a legal contingency might still be regarded as a 
judgement call by management and directors although it can be shown not to be prudent to do so. 
 
It does appear that the ceaseless optimism of directors is still a key ingredient in corporate disasters and that 
neither accounting conventions nor corporate law provisions seem able to temper this to a more cautious stance. 
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